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Abstract
This paper considers the linkages between output growth and output volatility for the
sample of G7 countries over the period 1958M2-2011M7, thereby paying particular attention
to spillovers within and between countries. Using the VAR-based spillover index approach by
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), we identify several empirical regularities: i) output growth and
volatility are highly intertwined, with spillovers taking place into all four directions; ii) the
importance of spillovers has increased after the mid 1980s and reached unprecedented levels
during the recent financial and economic crisis; iii) the US has been the largest transmitter
of output and volatility shocks to other countries. Generalized impulse response analyses
point to moderate growth-growth spillovers and sizable volatility-volatility spillovers across
countries, suggesting that volatility shocks quintuplicate in the long run. The cross-variable
effects turn out negative: volatilty shocks lead to lower economic growth, growth shocks
tend to reduce output volatility. Our findings underline the increased vulnerability of the G7
countries to destabilizing shocks and their detrimental effects on economic growth, which are
sizeably amplified through international spillover effects and the associated repercussions.
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1 Introduction
The theoretical literature on the relation between output volatility and economic growth is
controversial. According to Bernanke (1983), output volatility raises economic uncertainty and
thus hampers investment due to its irreversible nature, which in turn leads to lower economic
growth. Aghion and Howitt (2006) argue that volatility has a negative effect on growth under
credit market imperfections that constrain investments during recessions. On the contrary,
higher volatility (economic uncertainty) could increase precautionary saving and therefore lead
to higher growth rates (Mirman, 1971; Lensink et al., 1999). Optimal portfolio theory suggests
that volatile sectors command high investment rates (Imbs, 2007). Finally, a positive effect
of volatility on growth could also be due to a Schumpeterian ‘cleansing effect’ of recessions
(Caballero, 1991).1
The empirical literature on the relation between output volatility and economic growth,
which has used cross-section and panel data models as well as time series analyses of individual
countries, adds to this controversy. Ramey and Ramey (1995), Lensink et al. (1999), Martin
and Ann Rogers (2000), Badinger (2010) and Posch and Wa¨lde (2011) find that output growth
tends to be lower during periods of higher volatility. On the other hand, Grier and Tullock
(1989), Caporale and McKiernan (1996), Fountas and Karanasos (2006) and Lee (2010) find
that countries with higher output volatility tend to experience higher economic growth rates.2
Identifying the relationship between economic growth and volatility is aggravated by their
complex and intricate linkages. First, causality may run not only from volatility to growth but
also from growth to volatility, a point already made by Stiglitz (1993). The empirical literature
on this linkage is rather sparse. Fountas and Karanasos (2006) find that higher output growth
leads to significantly lower output volatility in two out of the G3 countries (Germany and the US)
between the mid-19th century and 1999, while Lee (2010), who uses a panel-GARCH approach
for the G7 countries over the 1965-2007 period, finds no significant relationship.
Second, in a world of highly interdependent economies, economic growth and output volatil-
ity spillovers from foreign countries are relevant determinants of a country’s own economic
growth and output volatility. Due to their high degree of economic integration, this holds par-
ticularly true for developed countries, for which a strong role of growth spillovers (Antonakakis
and Scharler, 2012) and volatility spillovers (Antonakakis and Badinger, forthcoming) has been
found.
The aim of this paper is to shed more light on this controversy by examining the linkages
between output volatility and economic growth both within and across the G7 countries. As a
first study on the linkages between growth and volatility, we use the VAR-based spillover index
approach recently introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012), which is particularly suited
for the investigation of systems of highly interdependent variables. In particular, it enables
an encompassing analysis to unravel the two-way relationships between output growth and
volatility, both within countries and accounting for spillovers between countries. Moreover, it
allows an assessment of the evolution of spillovers between output volatility and economic growth
over time, the identification of net receivers and transmitters of shocks, and the quantification
of their magnitude using impulse response analyses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the application of the
spillover index approach to disentangle the intricate relationships between volatility and growth
and describes the data used. Section 3 presents the empirical findings. Section 4 summarizes
the results and concludes.
1See Imbs (2007) for an extended discussion of the link between volatility and growth.
2For a comprehensive review and discussion of empirical studies, see Do¨pke (2004) and Norrbin and Yigit (2005).
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2 Empirical Model, Methodology, and Data
2.1 Definition of Spillover Indices for Output Growth and Volatility
In the following, we outline our application of the spillover index approach introduced by Diebold
and Yilmaz (2009). Building on the seminal work on VAR models by Sims (1980) and the well-
known notion of variance decompositions, it allows an assessment of the contributions of shocks
to variables to the forecast error variances of both the respective and the other variables of the
model. Using rolling-window estimation, the evolution of spillover effects can be traced over
time and illustrated by spillover plots.
For the purpose of the present study, we use the variant of the spillover index in Diebold
and Yilmaz (2012), which extends and generalizes the method in Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) in
two respects. First, they introduce refined measures of directional spillovers and net spillovers,
providing an ‘input-output’ decomposition of total spillovers into those coming from (or to)
a particular source (variable) and allowing to identify the main recipients and transmitters of
spillovers.
Second, in line with Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), Diebold and Yilmaz
(2012), we use a generalized vector autoregressive framework, in which forecast-error variance
decompositions are invariant to the ordering of the variables (in contrast to Cholesky-factor
identification used (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009)). In the context of the present study, this is
particularly important since it is hard if not impossible to justify one particular ordering of the
variables on output growth and volatility among the countries. Of course, the generalized VAR
framework has advantages and drawbacks. A disadvantage is that it aggravates the identification
of causal effects in a strict sense in the impulse response analysis. On the other hand, by fully
accounting for the pattern of observed correlation between shocks it increases the relevance
from a policy perspective in light of the increased synchronization of shocks and the growing
importance of a ‘world component’ in countries’ business cycles (Kose et al., 2003).
Starting point for the analysis is the the following P -th order, K-variable VAR
yt =
P∑
p=1
Θiyt−p + εt (1)
where yt = (y1t, y2t, . . . , yKt) is a vector of K endogenous variables, Θi, i = 1, ..., P, are K ×K
parameter matrices and εt ∼ (0,Σ) is vector of disturbances that are independently distributed
over time; t = 1, ..., T is the time index and k = 1, ..., K is the variable index. For each of the G7
countries considered (CAN,FRA,GER, ITA, JPN,UK,US), the VAR given by Equation (1)
contains observations on output growth (gn,t), and output growth volatility (σn,t, n = 1, ..., 7),
with n denoting the country index. Hence, with 7 countries and 2 variables, our VAR is made
up of K = 14 variables, i.e., yt = [g
′
t σ
′
t]
′, where gt and σt are 7x1 vectors with observation
on output growth and output volatility for each of the 7 countries respectively. For notational
simplicity, both variables gn,t and σn,t in (1), are referred to as yi,t and indexed by i = 1, ...,
K = 14 in the following.
The two key variables, output growth and output volatility3, are derived from monthly, sea-
sonally adjusted data on industrial production for the G7 countries over the period from Jan-
uary 1958 to July 2011. (Data source is the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.) Monthly
growth rates of real industrial production are obtained using the first difference of their log-
arithms. Given the lack of data at a higher than monthly frequency, precluding the use of
3Throughout the paper, the terms output growth volatility, output volatility, or simply volatility are used inter-
changeably.
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within-period realized volatility measures, we use the standard approach to calculate economic
uncertainty in terms of (conditional) volatility of industrial production growth, using univariate
GARCH models (see, for instance, Fountas and Karanasos, 2006; Fountas et al., 2004; Caporale
and McKiernan, 1998).4,5 Results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, which are
reported in Table 1 below, reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for each (country-specific)
series gn and σn, justifying the use of a VAR model for the subsequent analysis.
Key to the dynamics of the system is the moving average representation of model (1), which
is given by yt =
∑∞
j=0Ajεt−j , where the K ×K coefficient matrices Aj are recursively defined
as Aj = Θ1Aj−1 + Θ2Aj−2 + . . .+ ΘpAj−p, where A0 is the K ×K identity matrix and Aj = 0
for j < 0.
To avoid the use of identification schemes (such as Cholesky factorization) that make the
variance decompositions dependent on the ordering of the variables, Diebold and Yilmaz (2012)
use the generalized VAR framework of Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), which
produces variance decompositions invariant to the variable ordering. According to this frame-
work, the H-step-ahead forecast error variance decomposition is
φij(H) =
σ−1ii
∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iAhΣej)
2∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iAhΣA
′
hei)
, (2)
where Σ is the (estimated) variance matrix of the error vector ε, σii the (estimated) standard
deviation of the error term for the i-th equation and ei a selection vector with one as the i-th
element and zeros otherwise. This yields a K ×K matrix φ(H) = [φij(H)]i,j=1,...14, where each
entry gives the contribution of variable j to the forecast error variance of variable i. The main
diagonal elements contains the (own) contributions of shocks to the variable i to its own forecast
error variance, the off-diagonal elements show the (cross) contributions of the other variables j
to the forecast error variance of variable i.
Since the own and cross-variable variance contribution shares do not sum to one under the
generalized decomposition, i.e.,
∑K
j=1 φij(H) 6= 1, each entry of the variance decomposition
matrix is normalized by its row sum, such that
φ˜ij(H) =
φij(H)∑K
j=1 φij(H)
(3)
with
∑K
j=1 φ˜ij(H) = 1 and
∑K
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H) = K by construction.
This ultimately allows to define a total (volatility) spillover index, which is given by
S(H) =
∑K
i,j=1,i 6=j φ˜ij(H)∑K
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H)
× 100 =
∑K
i,j=1,i 6=j φ˜ij(H)
K
× 100 (4)
which gives the average contribution of spillovers from shocks to all (other) variables to the total
forecast error variance.
This approach is quite flexible and allows to obtain a more differentiated picture by consid-
ering directional spillovers: Specifically, the directional spillovers received by variable i from all
other variables j are defined as
Si←j(H) =
∑K
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ij(H)∑K
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H)
× 100 =
∑K
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ij(H)
K
× 100 (5)
4The optimal lag-length of each GARCH model is determined by the Schwarz information criterion and overfitting
tests.
5Our results are robust the the use of alternative measures of (unconditional) volatility, such as serial correlation
filtered squared residuals of output growth series as used, e.g., by (Lee, 2002). In fact, the correlation between
the unconditional and the conditional volatility measure is 0.82.
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and the directional spillovers transmitted by variable i to all other variables j as
Si→j(H) =
∑K
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ji(H)∑K
i,j=1 φ˜ji(H)
× 100 =
∑K
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ji(H)
K
× 100. (6)
Notice that the set of directional spillovers provides a decomposition of total spillovers into
those coming from (or to) a particular source. In the present application this means that our
spillover matrix φ(H) is made up of four blocks: the two main diagonal blocks (i, j = 1, ..., 7;
and i, j = 8, .., 14) reflecting growth-growth and volatility-volatility spillovers respectively; and
the off-diagonal blocks (i = 1, ..., 7, j = 8, ...14; and i = 8, ..., 14, j = 1, ...7), reflecting growth-
volatility and volatility-growth spillovers.
Finally, subtracting Equation (5) from Equation (6) we obtain the net spillover from variable
i to all other variables j as
Si(H) = Si→j(H)− Si←j(H), (7)
providing information on whether a country (variable) is a receiver or transmitter of shocks in
net terms.
The spillover index approach provides measures of the intensity of interdependence across
countries and variables and allows a decomposition of spillover effects by source and recipient.
The magnitude of the spillovers will then be quantified using impulse response analyses.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
Before turning to the estimation results, Table 1 provides summary statistics of our monthly
output growth and volatility series. Results are reported for the full sample from 1958M2-
2011M7 (642 observations), and for two subperiods from 1958M2-1984M12 (323 observations)
and from 1985M1-2011M7 (319 observations), which will be used in the econometric analysis
below. For the full sample, average output growth was highest in Japan with 0.38% (followed
by Canada and the US) and lowest in the UK with 0.1%. The largest volatilities are observed
for Italy and France, whereas Canada and US showed the most stable growth of industrial
production.
[Insert Table 1 here]
A look at the unconditional (contemporaneous) correlations in Table 1 reveals several interesting
features of our data. First, as expected, the correlations among growth rates and volatilities are
positive in the vast majority of cases, both within and between countries. Second, correlations
between volatility and growth are positive within countries (except for the US) and negative
between countries. Generally, these correlation are more pronounced in the post-1985 period.
Specifically, 86% of the correlations between volatility and growth are negative in the post-1985
period, compared with only 49% in the pre-1985 period.
3 Empirical findings
In the following we report the results from our empirical analysis, starting with the estimates
of the spillover index and its subindices, defined in Equations (4)-(7). We then consider the
evolution of spillovers indices over time and finally turn to the results from the impulse response
function analyses.
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In the estimation of model (1), a lag-length of 3, 2 and 1 is chosen for the full sample, pre-1985
and post-1985 sample, respectively, based on the Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian informa-
tion (BIC) criteria, and overfitting methods in the spirit of Ng and Perron (2005). Lagrange-
multiplier (LM) tests for autocorrelation in the residuals for each estimated VAR model do not
reject the null hypothesis of uncorrelated residuals up to 12 lags. To check for structural sta-
bility we used the Bai and Perron (2003) test, which identifies a break at the end of 1984 for
all series. The occurence of a structural break in the mid-1980s is also confirmed by a standard
Chow test. Hence, we will report separate estimation results for the pre- and post-1985 periods
in the following.
3.1 Spillover Indices
Tables 2 and 3 report the estimates of the spillover indices for the pre-1985 and post-1985 sample
period based in 12-months ahead forecast error variance decompositions. Before discussing the
results, let us describe the elements of these two tables. In Panel A of Tables 2 and 3, the
ij−th entry is the estimated contribution to the forecast error variance of variable i coming
from innovations to variable j (see Equation (2)). Note that each variable (index) is associated
with one of the G7 countries’ output growth or output volatility. Hence, the diagonal elements
(i = j) measure own-variable spillovers of output growth and volatility within countries, while
the off-diagonal elements (i 6= j) capture cross-variable spillovers between output growth and
volatility within and between countries. In addition, the row sums excluding the main diagonal
elements (labeled ‘Contributions from others’, see Equation (5)) and the column sums (labeled
‘Contributions to others’, see Equation (6)) report the total volatility spillovers ‘to’ (received by)
and ‘from’ (transmitted by) each variable. The difference between each (off-diagonal) column
sum and row sum, respectively, gives the net spillovers from variable i to all other variables
j (see Equation (7)). The total volatility spillover index defined in Equation (4), given in the
lower right corner of panel A in Tables 2 and 3, is approximately6 equal to the grand off-diagonal
column sum (or row sum) relative to the grand column sum including diagonals (or row sum
including diagonals), expressed in percentage points.
[Insert Table 2 here]
[Insert Table 3 here]
Summarizing the rich information in Tables 2 and 3, we identify several empirical regularities.
In general, growth-to-growth spillovers and volatility-to-volatility spillovers are larger within
countries than between countries. For instance, in the pre-1985 (post-1985) period, innovations
in US output growth are responsible for 78.7% (64.9%) of the 12-month ahead forecast error
variance of output growth in the US, but only for 7.7% (7.2%) of Canada. The same holds
true for spillovers from growth to volatility (and vice versa). For instance, innovations to output
growth in France explain 35.2% (5.7%) of the 12-month ahead forecast error variance of volatility
in France, but only 0.1% (1.2%) for Canada.
Comparing the results for the two time periods, we generally observe an increased importance
of spillovers effects in the more recent period as of 1985. The total spillover index, which is
reported in the lower right part of panel A and essentially distills all spillovers effects between
and within countries into a single measure, has increased from 18.5% in the pre-1985 period to
40.1% in the post-1985 period.
6The approximate nature of the claim stems from the fact that the contributions of the variables in the variance
decompositions do not sum to one and have to be normalized (see Equation (3)).
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On the one hand, this result is certainly driven to some extent by the recent financial and
economic crisis over the period 2008-2009. Restricting our estimates of the post-1985 sample
to the period up to June 2008 the change in the spillover index turns out more moderate with
an increase to 20%. On the other hand, one could argue that the large variation in the data
during the crises helps to identify the actual extent of spillovers (rather than overestimating
their extent). In this respect, notice that the spillover index captures shares in the contributions
to forecast error variances and is thus invariant to changes in the overall level of the volatility.7
Moreover, it should also be borne in mind that the post-1985 period (excluding the crisis)
coincides with the great moderation of output volatility.8 Hence, if the estimated increase in
spillovers for the period including the crisis is in fact partly driven by the increase in the overall
level of volatility, then one could argue that the increase from 18.5% to 20% (obtained for
the period of the great moderation excluding the crisis) underestimates the actual increase in
spillovers that would have occurred if volatility had remained constant.
The finding of an increased importance of spillover effects is particularly pronounced for
volatility spillovers originating in the US: The average contribution of US volatility spillovers
to other countries volatility amounted to 1% in the pre-1985 period and surged to an average
share of 9% (ranging from 0.02% to 17.6%) for the more recent period. This result is further
supported by the gross and net spillover indices by country reported in Panels A of Tables 2
and 3. Overall, the contribution to and from others has increased. Moreover, in terms of net
spillovers (see Equation (7)), the US hold the dominant position as transmitter of output growth
and volatility spillovers in the post-1985 period.
Our results are in line with Eickmeier et al. (2011). Focusing on the role of financial shocks
originating in the US during the recent financial and economic crisis, they find that the ‘global
financial crisis shock’ was very large by historical standards and that US shocks explain one third
of the variation in GDP growth on average over all countries in 2008-2009, compared with a little
less than 10% over the 1971-2007 period. While the results are not directly comparable since they
focus on financial rather than real shocks and use an alternative method (time-varying factor-
augmented VARs), the large vulnerability of countries due to the increased interconnectedness
of the world economy is a common finding.
In order to provide a more differentiated picture, Panels B in Tables 2 and 3 further parse
the directional spillovers into growth-growth spillovers and volatility-growth spillovers (‘Con-
tribution to others’ g’), as well as growth-volatility spillovers and volatility-volatility spillovers
(‘Contribution to others’ σ’). We can see that in the post-1985 (pre-1985) period, 32.56%
(41.73%) of all four gross directional spillovers are from growth to growth, with France (US)
and Italy (Canada) being the biggest contributors to output growth to the remaining G7 coun-
tries. The share of volatility-growth and growth-volatility spillovers is smaller with an average of
13.66% (15.23%), with the US (UK) being the main contributor, followed by Germany (France)
and UK (Italy). Finally, with a share of 28.42%, volatility-volatility spillovers make up a sub-
stantival fraction of total spillovers, with the US (Canada) being the largest transmitter to the
other G7 countries.
3.2 Spillover Plots
While we have split our sample according to the results of the structural break tests, the use
of an average measure of growth and volatility spillovers over a fairly long period might mask
7The increased volatility in the early 1980s is not equally reflected in an increase in spillovers during that period
(see also the results from the rolling-window estimates in section 3.2).
8The G7’s average output volatility in the pre-1985 period and the post-1985 period (up to 2008M6, excluding
the crises) amounted to 0.0307% and 0.0152%, respectively.
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potentially interesting information on secular or cyclical movements in spillover effects. Hence,
we estimate the model in Equation (1) using 180-month rolling windows and calculate the
variance decompositions and spillover indices for each subsample. As a result, we obtain time
series of estimated spillover indices, allowing us to judge the evolution of total and directional
growth and volatility spillover within and between countries over time.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 presents the results for the time-varying total spillovers indices obtained from the 180-
months rolling windows estimation for each of the subsamples. In the pre-1985 period output
growth and output volatility spillovers in the G7 countries remained relatively stable and below
30%. In the post-1985 period the spillover indices also remained stable around around 30% and
surged to unprecedented levels above 50% following the recent global financial and economic
crisis. Overall these results are in line with the average estimates for the subperiods, suggesting
an increased in the role of spillovers (in spite of the great moderation) and a surge during the
recent crisis period.
The results for the total total volatility spillover index are suggestive but they might discards
directional information that is contained in the “Contribution to others” row (Equation (5))
and the “Contribution from others” column (Equation (6)) in Panel A of Tables 2 and 3.
Figure 2 presents the estimated 180-month rolling windows directional spillovers from each of
the variables to others (corresponding to the “Contribution to others” row in Panel A of Tables
2 and 3) in the pre- and post- 1985 period, respectively. According to this figure, in the pre-1985
period, spillovers arise basically from output growth, with France, US and Canada holding the
dominant position as transmitters of output growth spillovers, while spillovers originating from
output volatility are smaller in magnitude. Specifically, the share of directional spillovers from
output growth sometimes reaches the 5% threshold, while the share of directional spillovers
from output volatility is below 2.5%. In the post-1985 period, in contrast, the contribution of
directional volatility spillovers increases to a share of 10% and receives the largest values for
US volatility and growth spillovers. In other words, there is increased influence of directional
spillovers in the post-1985 period, with the US lying at the epicenter of spillovers during the
recent economic crisis through its dominant role as transmitter of output volatility and growth
spillovers to the other G7 countries.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
[Insert Figure 3 here]
A similar pictures emerges when looking at the net directional spillover indices obtained from the
rolling window estimation. According to Figure 3, which plots the time-varying net directional
spillovers, we see that during the pre-1985 period France and US were the strongest transmitters
of growth spillovers in net terms. During the post-1985 period and especially during the recent
crisis, US output volatility constitutes the main source of net spillovers.
3.3 Impulse Responses
Having established the strong role and growing importance of spillover effects we next turn to
an impulse response analysis in order to shed more light on the intricate relationships between
volatility and growth. As already outlined above the results should be interpreted with care.
In particular, the effects of shocks to single variables should not be interpreted as causal (in
the sense of ‘all else being equal’), given that the generalized impulse responses account for the
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observed correlation of shocks across countries. This is a limitation on the one side. However,
given the increased synchronization of shocks and business cycles across countries, we do not
expect shocks to countries to appear in isolation from each other; and since there is no strong
reason to assume that the correlation pattern of shocks to countries will change fundamentally in
the short- to the medium-run, we argue that the generalized impulse responses can be regarded
as indicative for the effects of future shocks.
Results of the generalized impulse response analysis are reported for the post-1985 period,
using one standard deviation shocks to each of the G7 countries’ output growth and volatility
(see Pesaran and Shin, 1998). We first report the results for shocks to the US in light of its
dominant role as transmitter of spillover effects9 and then provide a broader picture in terms of
cross-country averages of impulse response effect of shocks to single countries.
Generalized impulse responses (GIR) of shocks to the US in the post-1985 period are illus-
trated in Figure 4. Panel a) of Figure 4 shows that output growth shocks to the US have positive,
but relatively short-lived effects on growth, compared with the relatively more persistent effects
of volatility shocks in panel b) of Figure 4. Specifically, the effects of output growth shocks
to the US on own and other countries’ output growth dissipate after some 12 months, whereas
the effects of shocks to volatility on own- and other countries’ volatility fade away after some 2
years.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Turning the cross-variable (i.e., growth-volatility and volatility-growth) spillovers, panel c) of
Figure 4 shows that overall, volatility shocks to the US have negative effects on growth, which
fade away after some 2 years. A qualitatively similar picture emerges for the effects of growth
shocks to the US on own- and other countries’ volatility in panel d) of Figure 4.
In order to provide a broader picture on the bottom line effect of growth and volatility shocks
we next calculate for each country the cumulative effects of a one-standard deviations shock to
growth (volatility) on the respective country’s growth (volatility), referred to as ‘within-country’
response in the following.10 Table 4 reports the averages of the cumulative effects i) of growth
shocks on growth and on volatility (first column), and ii) of volatility shocks on growth and on
volatility (second column). The cumulative effects are reported for time horizons of 6, 12, and
24 months. Since the effects of shocks have fully materialized after 2 years (compare Figure 4),
the cumulative 24-months responses can be interpreted as overall bottom line effect of incipient
shocks including spillover effects and the associated repercussions.
Regarding the direction of the effects, notice first that - as expected - volatility and growth
shocks have positive and multiplied effects on ‘themselves’. Of particular interest are the impulse
response effects across variables, i.e., the response of a country’s growth rate (volatility) to shocks
to volatility (growth) of the respective country. As evident from Table 4 we find a negative effect
of volatility shocks on economic growth, and also a negative effect of output growth shocks on
volatility. It worth emphasizing once more that the long-term cumulative impulse responses
reflect level rather than permanent growth rate effects.
The magnitude of the cumulative response effects has to be judged against the size of the
incipient shock, which corresponds to the standard deviation of the error term in the respective
equation of the VAR. In order to facilitate the interpretation and to make our results com-
parable with other studies, Table 4 reports (country-specific averages of) the implied response
multipliers, defined as the cumulative impulse response effect divided by the size of the incipient
9Impulse responses of shocks to other countries are qualitatively similar and not presented for the sake of brevity.
10Notice that with a stationary VAR the cumulative growth rate effects of one-time shocks have to be interpreted
as level effects and should not be confused with permanent effects on the growth rate.
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shock. In the discussion of the results we focus on the multiplier effects in the following. We
start with a discussion of growth-growth and volatility-volatility spillovers and then turn to the
cross-variable effects, i.e., the spillovers from growth to volatility and vice versa.
Notice first that the long-run multiplier effects of growth shocks are fairly small with a value
slightly above one (see the third column of Table 4). This result masks a bit that there are
substantial spillover effects to other countries. The ‘cross-country’ multiplier of shocks to other
countries (not reported in Table 4), which is defined as average multiplier of the six G7 countries’
growth in response to growth shocks to the other country amounts to 0.41. What the rather
small ‘within-country’ multiplier thus suggests is that that growth spillovers appear to mainly
materialize in ‘one wave’ and that the repercussions and feedback effects to the country of origin
are moderate.
[Insert Table 4 here]
In contrast, the long-run multiplier effects of volatility shocks are sizeable with an average
‘within-country’ response multiplier of 5.51. In line with previous studies this highlights the
role of international volatility spillovers as a crucial determinant of countries’ output volatility.
Carare and Mody (2010), who use factor-structural vector autoregressive models for a sample
of 22 countries over the period 1960-2007, find that 50-75% of total volatility in the post-1995
period is due to international spillovers. Our multiplier of 5.51 in response to volatility shocks
suggests that one fifth of the total increase in volatility is due to the incipient shock and that the
80% are triggered by international spillover effects.11 Since our sample also includes the 2008-
2009 crises, during which spillover effects have surged according to our estimates and those of
Eickmeier et al. (2011), we would expect somewhat larger effects of volatility shocks. This result
is also confirmed by the large ‘cross-country’ multiplier of shocks to volatility amounting to 1.04.
Volatility shocks and uncertainty appear to be highly contagious, persistent, and self-enforcing
through large feedback effects.
Turning to the cross-variable effects, we find a multiplier of -0.1451 for the effect of growth on
volatility. As one of the rare studies on this link, Fountas and Karanasos (2006) obtain smaller
coefficients of -0.034 for Germany and -0.018 for the USA, using univariate time series analyses.
The larger magnitude of our estimates that are based on more countries and account for cross-
country spillovers is plausible. And while the point estimates should not be overstressed, our
findings are qualitatively in line with intuitive theoretical arguments: According to the Phillips
curve, an increase in output growth raises inflation. Given the negative association between
inflation and output growth uncertainty (‘Taylor effect’), output volatility would be expected to
fall in response to positive growth shocks (Fountas and Karanasos, 2007).
Regarding the effects of shocks to volatility on economic growth, the multiplier effect amounts
to -1.0847. Hence, output volatility exerts a negative and sizeable effect on economic activity.
Comparing our results to previous studies that have estimated the effect of volatilty of growth
using large cross-sections of countries, our effects turn out larger in magnitude. Ramey and
Ramey (1995) obtain coefficients for the effect of volatility on economic growth in a range of
-0.4 to -0.5. The estimates by Fata´s and Mihov (2003) are closer to ours with a coefficient of
-0.8. Given the uncertainty involved in our point estimates, this discrepancy should not be
overemphasized. However, the larger magnitude implied by our estimates could be due to the
11Although the impulse response effects are not directly comparable with the variance decompositions in section
3.1, the multiplier effects are consistent with the spillover indices reported in Table 3. The average contribution
of volatility shocks to other countries’ volatility (in terms of the forecast error variance) for a 12-month horizon
amounts to 28.42%; the multiplier effect for the cumulative response after 12 months amounts to 4.08, also
suggesting a share of around one quarter.
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fact that the cross-sectional estimates of the aforementioned studies (relating country-specific
growth to country-specific volatility) do not fully capture the reinforcing effects of international
growth and volatility spillovers that are captured through the dynamics of our system.
4 Conclusions
The present paper considers the linkages between output growth and output volatility for the
sample of the G7 countries over the period 1958M2-2011M7, thereby paying particular attention
to spillovers within and between countries. Using spillover index estimates in the spirit of
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), we identify several empirical regularities: i) In line with theoretical
arguments, volatility and growth turn out empirically highly intertwined, with spillovers taking
place into all four directions, i.e., both from growth to growth (volatility to volatility) between
countries as well as from volatility to growth within and between countries (and vice versa). ii)
The importance of spillovers has increased after the mid 1980s and reached unprecedented levels
during the recent financial and economic crisis. iii) Among the G7 countries, the US turn out
as the largest transmitter of output and volatility shocks to other countries.
Generalized impulse response analyses point to positive though moderate growth to growth
spillovers and sizeable volatility to volatility spillovers, suggesting that volatility shocks quintu-
plicate in the long run through international contagion effects and the associated repercussions.
Regarding the cross-variable effects, we find a negative effect of growth on volatility in line with
the theoretical arguments that higher growth triggers higher inflation which is in turn associated
with lower output volatility (Taylor effect). Finally, volatility shocks turn out to have negative
effects on economic output. Qualitatively, our results are in line with previous studies that
have considered one-way linkages between volatility and growth within countries. However, the
magnitude of the estimated effects turns out larger, since our encompassing approach appears
to more completely capture the reinforcing propagation effects and dynamics of growth and
volatility spillovers, both within and between countries.
Our findings underline the increased vulnerability of the G7 countries to local and joint
destabilizing shocks and their detrimental effects on economic growth, which are sizeably am-
plified due to the high degree of economic integration. On the positive side, they highlight
the potentially huge gains (in terms of stabilization and growth multipliers) from international
policy coordination in the implementation of macroprudential stabilization policies, which may
result in a virtuous cycle of higher growth and lower volatility.
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Table 4: Cumulative impulse responses and multiplier effects, post-1985
Cumulative response1) Implied multiplier effect2)
From (j) From (j)
To(i) g σ g σ
6-months
g 1.0566 -1.0129 1.0159 -0.6589
σ -0.0437 2.3079 -0.0842 2.8332
12-months
g 1.0643 -1.4486 1.0375 -0.9281
σ -0.0717 2.5786 -0.1181 4.0828
24-months
g 1.0481 -1.8381 1.0370 -1.0847
σ -0.0986 2.8712 -0.1451 5.5058
Notes: 1) Cumulative generalized impulse response to one standard deviation shock, multiplied by 100 (in %).
2) Multiplier effect, calculated as ratio of cumulative response to incipient shock to the respective country.
All entries are averages over country-specific shocks to the respective variable.
Figure 1: Total spillover indices
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Notes: Plots of moving total spillover indices estimated using 180-month rolling windows.
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Figure 2: Directional spillovers from each countries’ output growth and volatility
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Notes: Plots of moving directional spillovers estimated using 180-month rolling windows. Blue bars indicate
output growth; red bars indicate output volatility.
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Figure 3: Net spillovers of output growth and volatility shocks for each country
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Notes: Plots of moving net spillover indices estimated using 180-month rolling windows. Blue bars indicate
output growth; red bars indicate output volatility. Countries with positive (negative) values are net transmitters
(receivers) of shocks.
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Figure 4: Generalized impulse responses to US shocks, post-1985 period
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Notes: Generalized impulse responses to one standard deviation shock to output growth (output volatility) of the
US. Blue lines indicate responses of output growth; red lines indicate responses of output volatility.
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